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The United States Navy recently sought the death penalty in the court-
martial of a black sailor who stabbed his white superior officer to death
aboard a frigate at sea. The sailor believed that the officer had blocked his
promotion out of racial prejudice.1 At the trial, the ship's commander ac-
knowledged that there was "plenty" of racism in the Navy. The defense
argued that the commander, a black, had failed to investigate properly the
defendant's complaint due to the opposition of his white superior officers.2
Discrimination remains a serious problem in the United States military.
As the law stands, however, when an enlistee dons a military uniform, she
sheds her right to a judicial remedy for employment discrimination.
The Supreme Court has foreclosed two of three possible causes of ac-
tion to uniformed military personnel who have suffered discrimination in
the service. In Chappell v. Wallace,3 the Court held that servicepersons
could not sue the military under the equal protection clause of the Fifth
Amendment because "the unique disciplinary structure of the Military
Establishment and Congress' activity in the field constitute 'special factors'
which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military
personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their superior officers." 4 Earlier,
1. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1986, at A14, col. 1.
2. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1986, at A13, col. 1.
3. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
4. Id. at 304. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), established that the victim of a constitutional violation by a federal officer has the right to
recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such
a right. The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars a similar action against the United States itself.
Commentators have criticized Chappell on a number of grounds. First, it leaves courts without
discretion to consider the adequacy of intramilitary remedies. Second, the Court departed from its
previous rule that it would refuse to provide a Bivens remedy only where Congress explicitly directs
that a plaintiff must rely on another equally effective remedy. Third, the Court took facts (the disci-
plinary structure of the military) apparently insufficient to defeat a claim as a "special factor counsel-
ling hesitation," and other facts insufficient to defeat a claim under the "alternative remedial scheme"
bar, and combined them to derive a basis for refusing a remedy. See Steinman, Backing Off Bivens
and the Ramifications of this Retreat for the Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L.
REv. 269, 285-91 (1984).
One court has since read Chappell to apply to a narrow set of cases. Stanley v. United States, 574
F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Fla. 1983), affid in part, rev'd in part, 786 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 642 (1986). The Stanley court would find "special factors" only where direct orders are
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in Brown v. GSA, 5 the Court ruled that sovereign immunity barred dis-
crimination claims against the federal government under 42 U.S.C. §
1981,' and by implication, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).7 The Brown Court held
that Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for discrimination in
federal employment." To date, however, no court has granted a serviceper-
son a remedy under Title VII.
Title VII extends the protections afforded by the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, to all employees "in military departments."9 Notwith-
standing this language, both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held that
Title VII does not apply to uniformed military personnel.10 The Supreme
Court has denied review of the issue.1 These courts thus deny any judi-
cial redress for employment discrimination to over two million citizens in
the nation's service.12 A lone district court has opined that Title VII ap-
plies to uniformed servicepersons. Even this court would limit its applica-
tion severely."3
This Note argues that courts should apply Title VII to the United
States military. It examines discrimination in the military and the inade-
quacy of current intramilitary remedies. The Note argues that uniformed
servicepersons are statutorily entitled to a remedy for employment dis-
crimination under Title VII. It contends that despite the often narrow and
questionable statutory arguments of the opinions, the driving force behind
the courts' denial of a Title VII remedy is the "separate community" doc-
trine, under which courts have traditionally declined to review claims con-
cerning the military for fear of interfering with military discipline and
efficiency, and for fear of interfering in a province supposedly entrusted to
the "plenary power" of Congress and the President. The Note contends
that courts' failure to examine the assumptions of this doctrine has led to
its misapplication in cases arising under Title VII. Finally, the Note sug-
involved. 574 F. Supp. at 479. The prevailing interpretation, however, is that Chappell necessarily
imposed a per se prohibition on the filing of Bivens-type actions by servicepersons against their super-
iors for alleged constitutional violations. E.g., Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1983). Moreover, although Chappell did not expressly apply to federal statu-
tory violations, some courts, after finding the same risks to military discipline involved, have applied
its reasoning to them. See, e.g., Mir v. Fosburg, No. 84-5667, slip op. (9th Cir. June 25, 1985).
5. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
8. 425 U.S. at 835.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1982).
10. See Gonzalez v. Department of the Army, 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Alexan-
der, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978).
11. Johnson v. Alexander, 439 U.S. 986 (denying certiorari).
12. In 1984, there were 2,138,000 uniformed military personnel on active duty. BUREAU OF CEN-
sUs, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 340 (106th ed.
1986).
13. Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). The court in fact denied redress in this
case. See infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
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gests that strict adherence to the procedural provisions of the statute
would minimize judicial interference with the military, yet protect ser-
vicepersons from undue abrogation of their fundamental rights.
I. DISCRIMINATION IN THE MILITARY
A. A History of Discrimination
Since the Civil War, various forms of discrimination have dampened
morale, heightened militancy, even sparked mutiny in the United States
military."' By the beginning of World War II, there were only five black
officers in the Regular army, three of whom were chaplains.15 During the
Vietnam War, discrimination hampered the combat effort itself. Fear and
resentment of racist commanders not only engendered disobedience and
desertions, but also incited lynchings, fraggings, and riots both at combat
posts in Asia and on training bases at home." Well into the 1960s, if not
beyond, the military assigned minorities tasks that perpetuated the image
of their meniality and the idea of their marginality to the service. Blacks
felt that they were either fodder for the infantry or stewards for the
officers.17
The recent influx of minorities and women as well as its all volunteer
policy have forced the military to make some progress toward eliminating
discrimination. 8 Blacks now constitute about 19% of uniformed person-
nel, although they make up only 12% of the general population. On the
other hand, women constitute 51% of the general population, but only
about 10% of servicepersons. Moreover, the percentages of blacks and
women in various ranks differ significantly. Thirty percent of the Army's
top noncommissioned officers are black, but only 6% of the Navy's are.
Sharp contrasts exist between the numbers of blacks and whites, and be-
tween the numbers of women and men, who hold commissioned offices,
the highest positions in the service. Black officers are concentrated in the
lowest three grades of commissioned offices. Black commissioned officers
14. M. BERRY, MILITARY NECESSITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 62-74, 90-91 (1977); R.
HOPE, RACIAL STRIFE IN THE U.S. MILITARY: TOWARD THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION
11-15 (1979); W. YOUNG, MINORITIES AND THE MILITARY 191-242 (1982).
15. G. PATTON, WAR AND RACE: THE BLACK OFFICER IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY,
1915-1941, at 176 (1981).
16. See D. CORTWRIGHT, SOLDIERS IN REVOLT (1975); R. HOPE, supra note 14, at 37-40. The
term "fragging" refers to the use of fragmentation grenades by enlisted personnel against superior
officers or other enlisted personnel. Id. at 43-47; see infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
17. NAACP, THE SEARCH FOR MILITARY JUSTICE: REPORT OF AN NAACP INQUIRY INTO
THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEGRO SERVICEMAN IN WEST GERMANY (1971) [hereinafter NAACP RE-
PORT]; PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE ARMED FORCES, INITIAL REPORT:
EQUALITY OF TREATMENT AND OPPORTUNITY FOR NEGRO MILITARY PERSONNEL STATIONED
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 3-25 (1963) [hereinafter GESELL COMMITTEE, INITIAL REPORT].
18. W. YOUNG, supra note 14, at 233-35.
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reach the proportion of blacks in the general population only in the Army.
They never reach the proportion of blacks in the service. And at the rank
of colonel or its equivalent, only 2.6% of officers are black. 9 Many black
officers claim that white superiors have often overlooked them for assign-
ments that could lead to promotion. These officers contend that discrimi-
nation has not disappeared from the service; it has merely "gone under-
ground."20 On the other hand, for women, the major career impediment is
an open, statutorily enacted policy. Women are excluded from combat and
therefore from senior command positions as well.21 Like minority men,
women also suffer from unaccepting or paternalistic attitudes of individual
superior (and inferior) officers.22
B. Intentional Discrimination2"
Due to their "extraordinary discretionary authority,"2 individual mili-
tary officers have wide latitude to discriminate against personnel below
them. First, officers may discriminate in granting promotions. Some
blacks complain that while white superiors tell them that they are doing
an outstanding job, they give them much lower written evaluations or
damn them with faint praise.2 5 In addition, individual commanders may
discriminate in handing out nonjudicial punishment and less than honora-
ble administrative discharges. The latter may mar a serviceperson's life-
long employment opportunities. Neither of these actions requires a hear-
ing.2" Finally, commanders may discriminate in transfer and other
assignments which can determine opportunities for career advancement.
C. Neutral Rules Having a Disparate Impact
In addition to intentional discrimination by commanders, the military
pursues a number of policies and practices that, although neutral on their
19. Halloran, Blacks and Women Find Roads for Advancement Through Life in Military, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 26, 1986, at B24, col. 1.
20. Id.
21. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 6015, 8549 (Supp. III 1976); see generally R. HOLM, WOMEN AND THE
MILITARY (1982).
22. Halloran, supra note 19, at B24, col. 1.
23. Intentional discrimination would give rise to a cause of action for disparate treatment if Title
VII were applied to the military. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982); McDonnell Douglas Corp v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
24. D. CORTWRIGHT, supra note 16, at 209.
25. Halloran, supra note 19, at B24, col. 1.
26. See generally D. CORTWRIGHT, supra note 16, at 201-19; GESELL COMMITTEE, INITIAL
REPORT, supra note 17, at 1-25; NAACP REPORT, supra note 17, at 1-11, 14-16; U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE
ARMED FORCES 27-29, 33-35, 67-74, 108-11 (1972) [hereinafter DoD TASK FORCE]; W. YOUNG,
supra note 14, at 219-35. In addition, servicepersons have charged that the military has engaged in
racially selective prosecution in courts-martial. See, e.g., United States v. Tatum, 17 M.J. 757 (1984).
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face, have a disproportionate, negative impact upon members of minority
groups and women. Such practices would give rise to a cause of action if
Title VII were applied to the military."
For instance, critics charge that the Armed Forces Qualification Test
(AFQT) measures educational and cultural background, not innate intel-
ligence."8 Even the military admits that it is not an accurate predictor of
performance.29 Because members of minority groups score "markedly"
lower than whites on this test, however, the military has often "chan-
neled" them into low skill, "soft core" fields or into the Army's infantry
unit, where there are few opportunities for further training and fewer for
promotion.30 Applied to the military, Title VII would proscribe the use of
discriminatory tests not related to performance in the service.
Unredressed, such discrimination is self-perpetuating. When women
and minority officers miss out on plum assignments to war colleges and
staff commands, they fail to obtain credentials and connections that will
enable them to obtain the next promotion. 1
D. Inadequacies of Intramilitary Remedies
The military is a notoriously tradition-bound and hierarchical institu-
tion which has often been slow to respect changing public values, includ-
ing those about discrimination, unless directed to do so by Congress, the
President, or the courts. Current intramilitary remedies for discrimination
are shockingly inadequate. Their principal deficiencies are: (1) control by
the chain of command; (2) lack of formal procedures, accountability, or
hearings; and (3) inappropriateness of military fora as courts of last
resort.
1. Command Influence
Military personnel may pursue remedies for discrimination either
under the regulations of the Department of Defense (DoD) Equal Oppor-
tunity Program" or under the general grievance procedure of Article 138
27. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employment practice not related to job
performance that operates to discriminate on basis of impermissible classifications unlawful under
Title VII).
28. D. CORTWRIGHT, supra note 16, at 204, 216-17; NAACP REPORT, supra note 17, at 1-3
(AFQT "a bonus for having grown up white"); DoD TASK FORCE, supra note 26, at 49.
29. DoD TASK FORCE, supra note 26, at 49.
30. D. CORTWRIGHT, supra note 16, at 203-04; NAACP REPORT, supra note 17, at 1-5; W.
YOUNG, supra note 14, at 226.
31. NAACP REPORT, supra note 17, at 4-5.
32. Department of Defense Equal Opportunity Program, 32 C.F.R. § 191 (1986). For an exam-
ple of individual service regulations pursuant thereto, see Equal Opportunity Program in the Army,
Army Reg. No. 600-21 (1977) [hereinafter AR 600-21].
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of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 33 Under either
scheme, one must proceed through the chain of command; there are no
independent channels. 4 Naturally, personnel are reluctant to file a com-
plaint against a superior officer with that officer for fear of retaliation.35
Concomitantly, officers have less than compelling incentives to investigate
and redress complaints against themselves or their colleagues when a chal-
lenge is raised by someone of inferior rank."6
2. Lack of Formal Procedures, Accountability, or Hearings
Not only does the chain of command control the grievance "process,"
but the "process" provides no detailed rules or strict accountability.
Neither the Equal Opportunity Program nor Article 138 prescribes any
procedures that the chain of command must follow in its investigation of
complaints. No particular officer is responsible for investigation."7 As a
result, the chain of command usually opts for "informal" investigations,
which are principally characterized by delay. The complainant almost
never gets a hearing. The "process" resembles a runaround. 8
33. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1982).
34. DoD regulations provide that "[tihe chain of command is the primary channel to correct
discriminatory practices and for communication of race relations and equal opportunity matters." 32
C.F.R. § 191.4(g) (1986). DoD regulations provide no alternative channels of complaint. Similarly,
Army regulations provide that "[i]ndividuals are encouraged to use command channels for redress of
grievances . . . . When appropriate an independent investigator should be appointed. Personnel as-
signed to [Equal Opportunity] offices should be consulted . . . in the resolution of complaints of
discrimination but should not be used to investigate such matters." AR 600-21, supra note 32, §§ 2-4
(1977). Not only is the appointment of an independent investigator discretionary, but the regulations
make no provision for how to do so or whom to appoint.
In parallel fashion, article 138 of the UCMJ provides:
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his commanding officer,
and who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused redress, may complain to
any superior commissioned officer, who shall forward the complaint to the officer exercising
general court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against whom it is made. The officer exercis-
ing general court-martial jurisdiction shall examine into the complaint and take proper mea-
sures for redressing the wrong complained of ....
10 U.S.C. § 938 (1982).
35. Servicepersons have claimed that they have been court-martialed on other grounds in retalia-
tion for filing complaints. See, e.g., United States v. Whalen, 15 M.J. 872, 875 (1983).
36. See R. RIVKIN, G.I. RIGHrs AND ARMY JUSTICE 181-83 (1970).
37. GESELL CoMMIT-TEE, INITIAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 27; see M. MACGREGOR, INTE-
GRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, 1940-1965, at 566 (Defense Studies Series, 1981) (instead of
issuing detailed guidelines and demanding strict accounting, DoD indiscriminately approved equal
opportunity plans even when plans eschewed real accountability in favor of vaguely stated principles);
see also supra note 34.
38. See R. RIVKIN, supra note 36, at 181-83 ("stalling tactics" of chain of command); R. RIVKIN
& B. STICHMAN, THE RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 122-30 (1977) (advising servicepersons
that letter to member of Congress is sometimes more promising avenue of complaint than use of chain
of commmand); Fox, Boards for Correction of Military Records, 88 CASE & COMMENT, SEPT.-OCT.
1983, AT 42, 44 (BOARDS FOR CORRECtION OF MILITARY RECORDS (BCMRs) RARELY GRANT
HEARING); NOTE, Judicial Review and Military Discipline-Cortright v. Resor: The Case of the
Boys in the Band, 72 COLuM. L. REV. 1048, 1067 (1972) (military discretion to institute informal
investigation).
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3. Inappropriateness of Military Fora as Courts of Last Resort
The cardinal goal of military law and military tribunals is discipline,
not justice. 9 For this reason, the Supreme Court has observed that
"courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the
nice subtleties of constitutional law."4 Although the military should have
the first opportunity to redress grievances against it, the courts should not
entrust entirely to the military a function, namely the preservation of indi-
vidual rights, which the military is inherently unsuited to perform.41 The
The Hill case provides a good example of the military runaround. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of
Law Opposing Defendant's Motion To Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, and Motion for Judg-
ment on the Pleadings at 9, 52-57, Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228 (1986). Promptly after her
discharge, Hill, initially acting pro se, then through attorneys, initiated administrative complaints. She
pursued these claims both where she had enlisted and in another city where she had worked. Hill's
attorneys communicated with the Army informally by telephone and letter, and then formally by a
verified written complaint. Throughout two years of administrative "review," the Army repeatedly
delayed and never held a hearing or addressed the merits of Hill's claim. The Army did not grant
Hill her honorable discharge papers, without which she had difficulty regaining civilian employment,
for 15 months.
With regard to Hill's discrimination complaint, her attorneys complained to her superior officer,
who was also an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Officer, and pursued the complaint up the
chain of command at each office to which she was directed. After nearly two years, Hill received a
"final" agency decision against her and a "right to sue" letter. When she did sue, however, the Army
defended on the grounds that she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because she had
not sought redress at the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR). Neither the
ABCMR nor any service BCMR, however, has jurisdiction over the substance of discrimination com-
plaints. By issuing an honorable discharge, a service precludes review by its BCMR. See Glines v.
Wade, 586 F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Saal v.
Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 197 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affd, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
39. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) ("A court-martial is not yet an indepen-
dent instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of the overall mecha-
nism by which military discipline is preserved.") (footnote omitted); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137
(1953) ("There are dangers lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided by the Bill of
Rights and Article III of our Constitution. Free countries of the world have tried to restrict military
tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among
troops in active service."); R. MoYERt, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY §§ 1-152 (1972) (military jus-
tice designed to serve discipline rather than justice; impact upon community more important than
individual result); R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO
Music 67-69, 91 (1970) (Blackstone characterized English military justice, upon which American
military justice is closely modeled, as "entirely arbitrary in its decisions and . . . something indulged
rather than allowed"; criterion of military administrative boards is convenience).
40. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265.
41. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.21 (1978) (review would strengthen
administrative process); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965)
("The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a
system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid."); Comment, God,
the Army, and Judicial Review: The In-service Conscientious Objector, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 379, 447
(1968) (military opposition to judicial review conveys impression that its process cannot stand light of
scrutiny).
The establishment of independent investigatory bodies would remedy some of the defects of the
current greivance process, especially its control by the chain of command. Cf 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1987)
(providing Courts of Military Appeal composed of civilian judges to hear appeals of courts-martial).
Independence, however, is not the only issue at stake. Establishing investigatory bodies within the
Department of Defense would not address the more profound issues of institutional competence and
values. The Constitution establishes Article III courts, not agency investigators, as the guardians of
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lack of an independent forum of last resort not only deprives the com-
plainant of the best guarantee of due process of law, but it deprives the
military of outside legitimation of its decisions."2
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Despite the history of discrimination in the military, the courts have
denied servicepersons a cause of action under Title VII. The Eighth and
Ninth Circuits agree that Title VII does not apply to uniformed military
personnel, but their rationales contradict each other. Although one district
court has held that the statute does apply to the military, it looked to
considerations outside the statute to restrict that application severely and
to deny a remedy in the case in question.
A. The Ninth Circuit: The Scope of the "Military Departments"
In Gonzalez v. Department of the Army, plaintiff alleged that he had
been denied a promotion because of intentional race discrimination on the
part of the Army. 43 Title VII applies to the "military departments as de-
fined in section 102 of Title 5 .'' 4 Nevertheless, in Gonzalez, the Ninth
Circuit held that Congress referred only to civilian employees when it
applied Title VII to the "military departments. 45 Ample evidence contra-
dicts that conclusion.
First, section 102 of Title 5 states: "The military departments are: The
Department of the Army[;] The Department of the Navy[;] The Depart-
ment of the Air Force. ' 4  Title 5 nowhere indicates any exclusion of uni-
formed personnel from these departments. In fact, Congress expressly de-
fines each of these departments to include uniformed personnel. For
example, the Department of the Navy is composed of, among other things,
"the entire operating forces . . . of the Navy and of the Marine Corps,"
and all "field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities
and functions under the control or supervision of the Secretary of the
civil rights. It also establishes that the civilian government is supreme over the military.
42. Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. at 1240-41.
43. 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1983). Following his termination, plantiff was granted reinstatement
and a promotion through administrative proceedings. Plaintiff alleged that despite these remedies, he
was still "at least four years behind his class-year contemporaries in the promotion process," and that
he had sustained other injuries. Id. at 927.
44. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16(a) (1982).
45. 718 F.2d at 927-28 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1982)). According to the court's con-
struction of the Code, "Congress intended a distinction between 'military departments' and 'armed
forces,' the former consisting of civilian employees, the latter of uniformed military personnel." Id. at
928. But the court ignored a number of Code provisions that indicate clearly that the armed forces are
part of the military departments, not separate from them. See infra text and accompanying notes
52-55.
46. 5 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
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Navy."' 47 In addition, Congress referred the reader to a general definition
of military "department" which expressly includes "all field headquarters,
forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions, '48 not
just civilian bureaucrats. Finally, Congress emphasized the breadth of the
term "department" by providing a separate definition of "executive part
of the department." Even these limited parts of the departments encom-
pass thousands of uniformed personnel.49
The legislative history of Title VII, like the language of the statute,
strongly supports a broad definition of department. The language of Title
VII precisely tracks the language of the Fair Labor Standards Act." That
statute, like Title VII, defines military departments by reference to 5
U.S.C. § 102, but then expressly limits its coverage to the civilian employ-
ees thereof.51 If the term "department" encompassed only civilian employ-
ees, such limitation would be redundant. Had Congress wanted to narrow
the coverage of Title VII, it would have done so in parallel fashion.
The Gonzalez court suggested that the term "military departments" re-
fers to civilian employees, whereas the term "armed forces" refers to uni-
formed personnel. 2 Congress has defined "armed forces," however, as
"the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. ' 5' As
noted above, Congress expressly includes the members of these bodies
within the "military departments. ' 5  Therefore, whereas the "armed
47. 10 U.S.C. § 5061 (1981). For explanation of the term "departments," the notes to section 102
refer to Title 10 of the Code, which relates to the armed forces. See also 10 U.S.C. § 5062(a) (1987)
("The Naty, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and service forces
.... ") (emphasis added); 10 U.S.C. § 5062(b) (1987). For similar definitions of the other depart-
ments, see 10 U.S.C. § 3062(b) (1987) (Army); 10 U.S.C. § 8062(b) (1987) (Air Force); 10 U.S.C. §
5063(a) (1987) (Marine Corps within Department of Navy).
48. 10 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1982) (emphasis added); see also 10 U.S.C. § 101 note (1982) ("[Tlhe
term 'Department' is defined to give it the broad sense of 'Establishment,' to conform to the source
statute and the usage preferred by the Department of Defense . . .).
49. 10 U.S.C. § 101(6) (1982) (" 'Executive part of the department' means the executive part of
the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, or the Department of
the Air Force, as the case may be, at the seat of the government."); 10 U.S.C. § 101 note (1982) ("the
term 'executive part of the department' refers to the limited sense of the executive part at the seat of
government. This is required by the adoption of the word 'department' . to cover the broader
concept of 'establishment.' ").
Each of the departments assigns both civilian and uniformed personnel to its executive part. See,
e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 5031 (1987) (Navy); 10 U.S.C. § 3031 (1987) (Army); 10 U.S.C. § 8031 (1987)
(Air Force); 10 U.S.C. § 5041 (1987) (Headquarters, Marine Corps in executive part of Department
of Navy).
50. Dowd, The Test of Emplo)'ee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 75, 94 (1984).
51. "[The term employee] means any individual employed by the Government of the United
States. . . as a civilian in the military departments as defined in section 102 of Title 5." 29 U.S.C. §
203(e)(2)(A)(i) (1982).
52. Gonzalez v. Department of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1983).
53. 10 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1987). These bodies are composed exclusively of uniformed personnel.
See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 5062(a) (1987) (Navy); 10 U.S.C. § 3062(b) (1987) (Army); 10 U.S.C. §
8062(b) (1987) (Air Force); 10 U.S.C. § 5063(b) (1987) (Marine Corps).
54. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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forces" encompass only uniformed personnel, the "military departments"
encompass both civilian and uniformed personnel.55
B. The Eighth Circuit: The Scope of "Employees"
In Johnson v. Alexander,56 plaintiff alleged that he had been denied
entrance to the Army on the basis of two regulations which operated to
discriminate against blacks. The Eighth Circuit concluded that uniformed
military personnel are not "employees" entitled to the protection of Title
VII. The court reasoned that military service "differs materially from [ci-
vilian] employment in a number of respects."'5 7 The court listed several
distinctions between military and civilian employment in a footnote,"8 but
failed to show any relevance of those distinctions to the objectives of Title
VII. Indeed, the main distinction noted by the court, that enlisted person-
nel may not freely quit their "job[s],"59 renders the need for Title VII
protection more compelling in the military than in civilian employment.
Other than the contractual term of employment, the only real distinction
between civilian employment and voluntary military employment is the
need for extraordinary discipline in the latter. Because the military need
not discriminate against its personnel in order to maintain discipline, the
distinction should not operate to exclude military personnel from the pro-
tection of Title VII.
The Eighth Circuit's holding, moreover, clashes with Congressional in-
tent that the coverage of the statute be expansive. The 1972 amendments
extended Title VII to cover "all federal personnel."60 Courts reason that
55. Moreover, because civilians are commingled with uniformed personnel on staffs in the execu-
tive parts of the military departments, civilians alone could not constitute the military departments.
See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 49. Thus, when Congress occasionally refers to "a civilian employee
of a military department. . . or a member of the armed forces, see, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 27 37(a) (1982),
it intends to indicate precisely to whom a statute refers, not to sever the armed forces from the mili-
tary departments. If the military departments were composed solely of civilians, Congress could refer
merely to "employees" of military departments. The term "civilian" would be surplusage. Moreover,
Congress frequently speaks of members of the armed forces "under the jurisdiction of" a military
department or its secretary. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 136(d) (1982) (requiring cooperation between secre-
tary and members of armed forces under department's jurisdiction); see also 10 U.S.C. § 541(b)
(1982); 10 U.S.C. § 2104(b) (1982). The general definition of military department, 10 U.S.C. §
101(5) (1982), as well as the specific definitions of each of the departments, include all forces "under
the control or supervision of" their respective secretaries. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying
text.
56. 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978). One of the regulations called for
disclosure of prior arrests even though the arrests were not followed by convictions. The other allowed
an applicant to be rejected if the applicant demonstrated an inability to get along with other people.
Id. at 1220.
57. Id. at 1223.
58. Id. at 1223 n.4 ("An enlisted man in the Army, for example, is not free to quit his 'job,' nor is
the Army free to fire him from his employment. Additionally, the soldier is subject not only to mili-
tary discipline but also to military law.").
59. id.
60. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 7 17(a), 86 Stat. 103, 111 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
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because Congress did not expressly state its intention to include the uni-
formed military, it must have intended to exclude them. In the light of
Congressional intent to provide comprehensive coverage with the 1972
amendments, the opposite presumption should obtain: Unless Congress
expressly excluded a group, silence in the legislative history indicates an
intent to include. Because Congress directed that the term "employee" in
Title VII be construed "in the manner common for federal statutes," the
legislative history of the term "employee" in federal labor statutes, among
others, provides evidence of Congress' intent that Title VII reach broadly
in its coverage. In Title VII, as in several other statutes, Congress left the
term "employee" undefined in order to include the broadest possible spec-
trum of workers despite distinctions between them.6' Furthermore, in con-
struing Title VII, courts have held that the term employee must be given
its "common, everyday meaning," 2which would surely include serviceper-
sons. Moreover, uniformed military personnel would qualify as employees
even under the narrowest federal statutory definition," under the narrow
common law "right to control" test, which stresses physical control over
the worker, and under the "economic realities" analysis, which examines
the employee's dependency upon the employer.64
§2000e-2016(a) (1982)).
61. Title VII states merely that "the term 'employee' means an individual employed by an em-
ployer," with certain exceptions not relevant here. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); see Dowd, supra note 50, at
78.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the use of the undefined or unlimited term "employee"
should be analyzed in light of its statutory purpose. If the statute in question is designed to serve a
broad remedial goal, then the term should be broadly construed. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
322 U.S. 111 (1944), for example, the Court stated that the term "employee" did not have a static
meaning. "Rather, 'it takes color from its surroundings . . .[in] the statute where it appears'...
and derives meaning from the context of that statute, which 'must be read in the light of the mischief
to be corrected and the end to be attained.'" Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 545 (1940)); South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 259
(1940). The definition of employee status included factors that would indicate whether "particular
workers . . . are subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute was designed to eradi-
cate." 322 U.S. at 127. Both the military and the Supreme Court have conceded that uniformed
military personnel are subject to discrimination, the evil that Title VII was enacted to eradicate. The
Court has, moreover, admitted in dictum that the "relationship of the Government to members of the
military . . . .is . . .that of employer to employee." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974).
62. Cobb v. Sun Papers, 673 F.2d 337, 339 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982); see
also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (no per se exemption of partnership decisions
from scrutiny despite fact that partners are not "employees" for most legal purposes). In addition,
Congress has included members of the armed forces in its policies governing federal employees. See,
e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982); Child Support Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. §
659(a) (1982); Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2403(j) (1982); Inspector General Act of 1978, 5
U.S.C. app. 3 § 8(3) (1982).
63. See Dowd, supra note 50, at 89-95 (discussing narrow "right to control" test at common
law). The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) contains the narrowest federal statutory definition
of "employee." See id. at 92-94. The Supreme Court has interpreted the NLRA definition as coex-
tensive with the common law "right to control" test. NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256
(1968); Dowd, supra note 50, at 92; see infra note 64.
64. Both Hearst, 322 U.S. 111, and United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947), employ a common
law "economic realities" test to determine employee status. "[When] the economic facts of the relation
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The Eighth and Ninth Circuits interpret the language of Title VII in
contradictory fashion. Whereas the Ninth Circuit held in Gonzalez that
the phrase "military departments" in Title VII does not encompass uni-
formed employees, the Eighth Circuit expressly conceded in Johnson that
it does. 6 5 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit, despite the relative weakness of
its "military department" holding, has never even bothered to raise the
still weaker "employee" argument upon which the Eighth Circuit rests its
rule."8 Because the courts cannot agree on cogent reasons why Title VII
should not apply to the military, their consensus is largely illusory.
C. The District Court Opinion
In Hill v. Berkman, plaintiff alleged that the Army's closing of the
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Specialist (NBC Specialist) position to
women was not substantially related to the combat exclusion policy as the
Army contended, but instead represented intentional sex discrimination.
In Hill v. Berkman, the court disagreed with the line of authority holding
that Title VII does not apply to the uniformed military. Although it char-
acterized the legislative history as the court stated that "[t]he plainest ren-
dering of the statute suggests that Title VII does not distinguish between
uniformed employees and civilian employees. ... . In the absence of a
make it more nearly one of employment . . . with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished by
the legislation, those characteristics may outweigh technical legal classification for purposes unrelated
to the statute's objectives and bring the relation within its protections." Hearst, 322 U.S. at 128
(discussing "employers" and "independent contractors"). The economic realities test focuses on the
dependency of the worker on the employer. Its application has resulted in a flexible standard that
favors inclusion of a broad group of workers under the term "employee." See Dowd, supra note 50, at
93.
Professor Dowd advocates a version of the economic realities test which would assess the employer's
ability to affect an individual's employment opportunities. Dowd, supra note 50, at 77. Given the
binding nature of an enlistment in the service, as well as the stigma (especially with respect to future
employment opportunities) of a dishonorable discharge, the military and its uniformed personnel
would stand in an employer-employee relationship under this test as well.
Uniformed servicepersons would qualify as employees even under the older, narrower common law
"right to control" test, which assesses only the employer's right to control the worker. See, e.g., Cobb,
673 F.2d at 339; Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972). Surely the military
has an even greater degree of control over its personnel, who are subject to exacting discipline and
cannot quit, than many civilian employers who fall within the test have.
65. "The great 'military departments' of this country referred to in 5 U.S.C. § 102 include...
uniformed personnel of various ranks and grades . . . ." 572 F.2d at 1224.
66. The Eighth Circuit, moreover, has acted at odds with its own doctrine. On one occasion, for
instance, the panel held that although Title VII did not protect a member of the Arkansas National
Guard, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 did. (Section 1981 presumably applied because the various National Guards
are state, not federal, organizations.) But the court made express and exclusive use of Title VII doc-
trine to evaluate the § 1981 claim. See Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1201 (8th Cir. 1981) ("The
evidence . . . can be analyzed within the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green . . . . That decision was rendered in a Title VII action.").
67. 635 F. Supp. 1228 (1986). Plaintiff did not challenge the validity of the combat exclusion
policy itself. She merely contended that in this case, the Army was using the combat exclusion policy
as a pretext for discriminating against women.
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contrary decision by Congress, there is no reason for a military exception
to the equal protection policies embodied in Title VII."6
Despite its rejection of a military exception to Title VII, the ruling in
Hill narrowly circumscribed the application of Title VII to military per-
sonnel actions. First, it suggested that courts should apply a balancing test
similar to that announced by the Fifth Circuit in Mindes v. Seaman,69 a
constitutional action, to determine whether to review a Title VII claim
against the military." The Mindes test affords the military a high degree
of judicial deference."' Applying this test, the court declared that in order
to avoid second-guessing "day-to-day decisions crucial to disciplinary rela-
tionships," courts should not afford a Title VII remedy for "isolated indi-
vidual allegations of discrimination [which] are best left to intramilitary
review."" 2 Second, the court held that even for policy decisions that affect
a large number of personnel, the test for judicial intervention is "whether
the military decision was clearly arbitrary and erroneous, with a harmful
effect present at the time the dispute reaches the court." 3 The court con-
tended that a highly deferential test based on a "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard would "allow[s] the armed forces necessary flexibility to make
changes and alter policy."17 4 It did not explain why military policies hav-
ing discriminatory impact should be afforded more deference than those of
other organizations." Nor did the court attempt to justify the requirement
that a harmful effect be present at the time of suit.
The strikingly narrow reasoning of the appellate cases and the courts'
failure to address the conflicts between them suggest that the courts have
cloaked policy objections to Title VII claims in the guise of statutory con-
Hill enlisted in the Army Reserve on the understanding that she would become an NBC Specialist.
After she had completed basic training, taken an unpaid leave from her job, and given up her apart-
ment, the Reserve informed her that it had reclassified the NBC position as a "combat support role,"
and had thus closed it to women. After adverse public reaction, the Army reopened the NBC position
to women thirteen months later. The Army's current policy is that the NBC position is not a combat
position. Women are currently working as NBC Specialists. Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1231-32; Plain-
tiff's Memorandum of Law Opposing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment,
and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 1-9, Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228 (1986); see
supra note 38.
68. Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1236, 1237 (1986).
69. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
70. Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1240. Although Mindes involved a claim brought under the Constitu-
tion, Judge Weinstein found "its analysis relevant in a Title VII context where questions of deference
may affect the exercise of jurisdiction." Id.
71. See Comment, Federal Judicial Review of Military Administrative Decisions, 51 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 612, 617-20 (1983).
72. Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1241.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Indeed, Judge Weinstein suggested that the policy decisions of all organizations deserve a high
degree of judicial deference: "[Plolicy decisions, subject to change, characterize all active organizations
and must develop freely." Id. at 1241. But Title VII prohibits employment policies not justified by
business necessity that operate to discriminate. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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struction. 78 As Hill v. Berkman illustrates, however, statutory construc-
tion raises the strong possibility that Congress intended Title VII to cover
all military personnel. Because the legislative history of Title VII man-
dates that it be construed broadly to effectuate its compelling purpose of
enforcing the equal protection clause," courts should resolve statutory am-
biguities in favor of inclusion.
III. THE SEPARATE COMMUNITY DOCTRINE AND ITS
MISAPPLICATION IN DISCRIMINATION CASES
In the majority of cases involving the military, courts defer to the mili-
tary under the vague yet expansive "separate community" doctrine78
Courts' refusal to apply Title VII in military cases is most likely driven
not by their narrow statutory arguments but by this general deference to
the military. The Supreme Court stated the reasoning underlying the sep-
arate community doctrine in 1954 in Orloff v. Willoughby:
"[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army. The respon-
sibility for setting up channels through which . . . grievances can be
considered and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and upon the
President of the United States and his subordinates. The military
constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline
from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judi-
ciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters
as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial
matters.
17 9
Even commentators who sympathize with this doctrine agree that courts
have failed both to delineate its boundaries and to analyze its assump-
tions. 80 Moreover, courts have failed to show why the doctrine should ap-
76. Rather than examine the conflicting rationales of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, most district
courts merely cite to those authorities without independent analysis. See, e.g., Cobb v. United States
Merchant Marine Academy, 592 F. Supp. 640 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Hunter v. Stetson, 444 F. Supp.
238 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (same); see also Helm v. California, 722 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying
Eighth and Ninth Circuit Title VII decisions to determine scope of Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 633(a), whose language tracks that of Title VII); Simpson v. United
States, 467 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (ADEA does not apply to National Guard technician);
Lear v. Schlesinger, 17 F.R.D. 8497 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (same).
77. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Hill, 635 F. Supp. at
1237.
78. The separate community doctrine is also known as the military necessity or nonreviewability
doctrine. See generally Comment, supra note 41, at 379-85, 413-47.
79. 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953).
80. See, e.g., Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Con-
stitutional Rights, 62 N.C.L. REV. 177 (1984). Hirschhorn, a strong supporter of the separate com-
munity doctrine, concedes that the Supreme Court has failed to supply a satisfactory rationale for it.
"[T]hat military personnel do not enjoy the same rights as civilian personnel is advanced as a reason
why they should not." Id. at 202. The majority of the Court, he continues, is unwilling to compare
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ply in discrimination cases. In recent decisions affirming the separate
community doctrine, the Supreme Court has relied on military cases from
the nineteenth century.8' At the same time, the Court has ignored current
literature from other disciplines that illuminates the nature of the modern
military. 2 The Supreme Court's outmoded military jurisprudence has led
lower courts to apply the separate community doctrine overbroadly to dis-
crimination cases, particularly those under the statutory rubric of Title
VII. The misapplication derives from misconceptions about three critical
issues: the nature of the military, the nature of military discipline, and the
separation of powers.
A. The Nature of the Military
The courts assume that the military is a "society apart"83 from civilian
society. That assumption clashes with the social and economic realities of
the military and of discrimination.
1. Social Integration
Sheer numbers undermine the premise of the separate community doc-
trine.8 In 1984, 2,138,000 uniformed military personnel were on active
the existing state of affairs with alternatives closer to civilian norms. "The majority does not articulate
a reason for this distinctive unwillingness to question legislative and administrative judgment where
individual rights are concerned. Instead, it consistently asserts, without further elaboration, that the
purpose of the armed forces is to ight wars, which requires a climate of discipline and unquestioned
obedience without parallel in other activities of the government." Id. at 203.
81. In Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), for example, Justice Rehnquist relied on random
quotations about the military from cases from the 1890's. Many of these early cases had been little
cited in the 20th century. On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist offered no analysis of First Amend-
ment policies or of the causes of dissent in the military. See Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctri-
nal Restraints in Controlling the Military, 49 IND. L.J. 539, 570-71 (1974).
82. Certainly social science is not an infallible guide to the decision of military cases. Often it
raises as many questions as it answers. But assumptions like those in Parker v. Levy, supported only
by unverified quotations from another century, are inadequate means of responding to the changed
conditions of the modern military. See Sherman, supra note 81, at 544, 573.
83. Parker, 417 U.S. at 744 (citing Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)); see Zillman &
Imwinkelried, Constitutional Rights and Military Necessity: Reflections on the Society Apart, 51
NOTRE DAME LAW. 396 (1976).
84. Chief Justice Warren, for example, has written:
[E]vents quite unrelated to the expertise of the judiciary have required a modification in the
traditional theory of the autonomy of military authority.
These events can be expressed very simply in numerical terms. A few months after Wash-
ington's first inauguration, our army numbered a mere 672 of the 840 authorized by Congress.
Today, in dramatic contrast, the situation is this: Our armed forces number two and a half
million; every resident male is a potential member of the peacetime armed forces; such service
may occupy a minimum of four percent of the adult life of the average American male reach-
ing draft age; reserve obligations extend over ten percent of such a person's life; and veterans
are numbered in excess of twenty-two and a half million. When the authority of the military
has such a sweeping capacity for affecting the lives of our citizenry, the wisdom of treating the
military establishment as an enclave beyond the reach of the civilian courts almost inevitably is
drawn into question.
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duty. 5 One fifth of all adults have had military experience. 8 Most en-
listed personnel and junior officers remain in frequent contact with the
civilian community and return to it after fairly short tours of service; they
do not become isolated from American society.8s
This contact is significant. As a military task force itself pointed out,
discrimination in the military has its roots in civilian society. "[T]he mili-
tary system is not entirely independent of or isolated from, the larger
society. . . . The one is part of the other . . . . To the extent that the
larger system discriminates against its own personnel . . . , the smaller
system plays its role in effecting that discrimination."88
More importantly, discrimination in the military feeds discrimination in
civilian society. For example, a Pentagon committee reported in 1969 that
the Marine Corps was returning Marines, both black and white, to civil-
ian society with more deeply seated prejudices than they possessed upon
entrance to service.89 A former Marine Corps Commandant has pointed
out that "[t]oday most middle-aged men, most business, government, civic
and professional leaders, have served some time in uniform. Whether they
liked it or not, their training and experience have affected them, for the
creeds and attitudes of the armed forces are powerful medicine, and can
become habit-forming . . ... 9 Because the military is an integral part of
society, Title VII must apply to servicepersons in order to achieve its goal
of ending societal employment discrimination.
2. Economic Integration
The end of the Second World War saw the birth of the "military in-
dustrial complex" or the "defense industry." Far from "a society apart,"
today's military forms an integral part of the economy which employs
more people, has a larger budget, and accounts for a larger percentage of
the gross national product than any other entity in the nation.91 In other
words, the military is a major employer and should be subject to the same
antidiscrimination requirements as all other government and private em-
ployers. The military itself acknowledges the convergence of military ser-
Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 187-88 (1962).
85. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, at 340.
86. R. SHERRILL, supra note 39, at 213.
87. Hirschhorn, supra note 80, at 205. Not only are servicepersons not physically isolated from
civilian society, but social scientists generally agree that since World War II, military and civilian
social structures have gradually converged due to technology and the bureaucratization of military
functions, among other factors. Sherman, supra note 81, at 542.
88. DoD TASK FORCE, supra note 26, at 16-17; see also D. CORTWRIGHT, supra note 16, at
208 (roots of discrimination in military lie partly in civilian society).
89. D. CORTWRIGHT, supra note 16, at 210.
90. R. SHERRILL, supra note 39, at 213.
91. R. HOPE, supra note 14, at 1; see also U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, at 330-31.
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vice with civilian employment. In order to fill its ranks, today's volunteer
military aggressively advertises itself as an employer and a stepping stone
to careers in the private sector. 2 Indeed, the great majority of serviceper-
sons perform technical, clerical, and other tasks similar to those of civilian
employees.93
Moreover, those advertisements have drawn racial and ethnic minori-
ties, and increasingly, women-precisely those groups that Title VII was
enacted to protect-to enlist in the military in high numbers."' Thus, to
exclude the uniformed military from Title VII would be to exclude a sub-
stantial percentage of the Act's intended constituency from its protection.
B. Military Discipline
The military's singular mission to prepare for combat and its concomi-
tant need to exact unfailing discipline may indeed justify limitation of
some civil rights of soldiers.95 The courts, however, have failed to weigh
the actual threat to discipline of affording a remedy for discrimination.
Even more critically, the courts have failed to weigh the costs to the mili-
tary and to society of not affording a remedy. Courts that apply the sepa-
rate community doctrine in antidiscrimination cases rely on two false
premises: that antidiscrimination suits will disrupt military discipline, and
that disallowance of such suits will preserve military order.
1. The Costs of Not Affording a Remedy
Again and again, courts have refused to allow servicepersons to sue the
military for discrimination and other grievances because of the purported
threat to discipline and the alleged fear of a flood of suits.9 Discrimina-
92. The typical refrain of military recruiting commercials is: "Find your future in the Army."
The way that the military promotes itself impeaches its argument that it is not an employer and that
servicepersons are not employees. Its advertisements do not suggest that recruits will join an isolated
society, but stress the career opportunities that service affords in both military and civilian life. One of
the main advertisements tells potential recruits that the Army will send them to college after their tour
of service. Another reminds recruits that "It]he computer training is yours forever." Still another
claims that "the army is the world's largest school for high technology." See supra Section II.B.
93. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1980); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 84 (White, J., dissenting) (1980) (in event of mobilization, military would
have to conscript at least 80,000 people for noncombat positions); Zillman & Inwinkelried, supra note
83, at 403-04; Hirschhorn, supra note 80, at 205-06.
94. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, at 341 (Table No. 566).
95. See generally Hirschhorn, supra note 80. Hirschhorn carries the discipline argument farther
than any other court or commentator. He argues not only that strict discipline is essential to effective
warfare, but that "the Constitution permits the United States an unlimited choice of ends in war,
which necessarily implies an unlimited choice of. . .means." He then argues that "these ends can be
effectively pursued with safety to the political instititutions of the Constitution only by subordinating
the personalities of members of the armed forces to the will of the political authorities." Id. at 208.
96. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir.
1968) ("[T]he courts must have regard to the flood of unmeritorious petitions that might be loosed by
2098
Vol. 96: 2082, 1987
Title VII and the Military
tion itself, however, poses a grave threat to military discipline, morale,
and order. Close examination has revealed even instances of apparently
spontaneous racial violence to be prompted by underlying resentment by
blacks of unequal treatment by the command.97 Events in Vietnam sug-
gested that black resistance to discriminatory command substantially im-
paired combat efficiency. 8 The Congressional Black Caucus found that
racial polarization on account of discriminatory practices could potentially
stalemate the overall effectiveness of the military as a fighting force.99
Courts do not protect military order by ignoring military discrimination.
2. The Costs of Affording a Remedy
The military has never substantiated, nor has it been asked to substan-
tiate, its claims that judicial review will disrupt discipline and invite an
avalanche of suits. In fact, Article III courts have adjudicated a number of
constitutional antidiscrimination claims against the military without im-
pairment of discipline or a flood of suits.""0 Statutory claims under Title
VII, the parameters of which are precisely defined by the Congress, pose
still less of a threat of intrusion. Moreover, floods predicted by the mili-
tary have failed to materialize in the past. When federal courts granted
habeas corpus review to those imprisoned by courts-martial, 01 for in-
stance, the military predicted a flood of suits. Chief Justice Warren later
such interference with the military's exercise of discretion and the effect of the delays caused by these
in the efficient administration of personnel who have voluntarily become part of the armed forces."),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 929 (1969); see also Note, supra note 38, at 1056 (courts fear intervention will
result in flood of claims not deserving of judicial review); infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text;
supra note 76.
97. De Nike, The New "Problem Soldier"-Dissenter in the Ranks, 49 IND. L.J. 685, 687-89
(1974).
98. D. CORTwRIGHT, supra note 16, at 41 ("Claiming that they would be endangered by racist
commanders, Willie Moten and six others of C Company. . .refused to move into the field. There is
no telling how many other similar incidents took place . . ... "); see also id. at 56, 140, 154-55, 210,
218-19 (Army racism resulted in refusal to follow orders; black revolt; challenge to stability of armed
forces, future of all volunteer force, survival of American military; threat to national security).
99. Id. at 218-19. Furthermore, lack of any meaningful remedy for discrimination may increase
frustration, disrespect for superiors, and resort to violent self-help remedies on the part of uniformed
personnel. For instance, a black sailor recently stabbed his white superior officer to death aboard a
frigate at sea. The sailor believed that the officer had blocked his promotion out of racial prejudice.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1986, at A14, col. 1. At the court-martial, the ship's commander acknowledged
that there is "plenty" of racism in the Navy. The defense argued that the commander, a black, had
failed to investigate the defendant's discrimination complaint properly on account of opposition of his
white superior officers. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1986, at A13, col. 1. The court-martial convicted the
sailor of murder and sentenced him to life in prison.
100. See, e.g., Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976) (Marine Corps mandatory
pregnancy discharge rule unconstitutional violation of equal protection); see also Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (not discriminatory to allow women officers longer term of service without
promotion because they have lesser opportunities due to combat exclusion); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statute discriminating with respect to spousal benefits of uniformed personnel
on basis of sex held unconstitutionally discriminatory).
101. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
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noted, however, that the courts actually received strikingly few peti-
tions.102 In addition, typical Title VII actions against the military would
involve routine personnel decisions similar to those made in any other
agency.103
Furthermore, courts have not discussed the close relationship between
discipline and morale. 0 Studies indicate that the perceived fairness of a
system of military justice has a positive effect on discipline.1 05 Safeguard-
ing rights through Title VII actions would probably strengthen discipline,
not slacken it.
3. Distinction Between Discrimination and Other Causes of Action
In cases concerning the military, courts typically quote from a melange
of precedents involving review of courts-martial and administrative ac-
tions, 0 6 constitutional and statutory rights, 07 routine and political ques-
tions. Sometimes the courts ignore the fact that although all of these ac-
tions may raise the same concerns, namely military discipline and
102. Warren, supra note 84, at 188-89 ("[Slince 1951 the number of habeas corpus petitions
alleging a lack of fairness in courts-martial has been quite insubstantial.").
Similarly, the military argued against the adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in
1951 on the grounds that its broadening of the rights of servicepersons was a threat to discipline. Yet
the UCMJ has not resulted in any substantial breakdown of discipline and in very few appeals in the
civil courts have ensued. Id.; Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME. L. REV. 3,
49-50 (1970).
103. See Comment, supra note 71, at 622.
104. Even Baron von Steuben, the strict Prussian military theorist and disciplinarian, recognized
the importance of morale. According to von Steuben, a captain's first object should be "to gain the love
of his men, by treating them with every possible kindness and humanity, inquiring into their com-
plaints, and when well founded, seeing them redressed." quoted in R. RIVKIN, supra note 36, at 335.
Modern social and military scientists confirm von Steuben. Experiences of the French Army and
German Navy in World War I, for instance, demonstrate that resistance to military authority first
arises from non-ideological threats to soldiers' well-being, such as danger, poor material conditions,
and, significantly, degrading use of military authority. See L. RADINE, THE TAMING OF THE
TROOPS: SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY 9-10, 34-38, 78-79, 115-16 (1977);
Hirschhorn, supra note 80, at 224-25.
In addition, observers have questioned the relationship between discipline itself and combat readi-
ness and effectiveness. Studies of enlisted personnel have shown that only 1% fought because of "lead-
ership and discipline." Self-preservation, self-respect, and expectations of family and colleagues were
far more important. Even among officers, only 19% peroent thought that soldiers fought due to disci-
pline. See R. RIVKIN, supra note 36, at 336-38.
Obviously, none of these issues can be resolved in the space of a footnote. Raising them, however,
demonstrates the pervasiveness and complexity of the unexamined assumptions upon which many
military cases rest.
105. See Note, supra note 103, at 328 n.130; cf. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 371 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The forced absence of peaceful expression only creates the illusion of good
order; underlying dissension remains to flow into the more dangerous channels of incitement and
disobedience. In that sense, military efficiency is only disserved when First Amendment rights are
devalued.").
106. See Peck, The Justices and the Generals: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review of Mili-
tary Activities, 70 MIL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1975); Comment, supra note 71, at 414, 422, 423 n.197.
107. See generally Baskir, Reflections on the Senate Investigation of Army Surveillance, 49 IND.
L.J. 618, 637-48 (1974) (adjudication of constitutionality of army surveillance).
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separation of powers, they implicate them in different ways. Many of the
cases in which the courts have limited servicepersons' constitutional rights,
for instance, have arisen under the First Amendment. In these cases, the
serviceperson has sought the right to take positive actions-to circulate
petitions,"'8 to tell black soldiers not to fight, 09 to wear nonuniform arti-
cles of clothing"°-which pose a threat to the discipline, order, and mo-
rale of the armed forces. Similarly, in Sixth Amendment actions, ser-
vicepersons have sought the right to force the military to change its
procedures with respect to the speedy exercise of discipline." 1 In an action
for discrimination, however, the only threat to discipline that the military
has ever cited is the threat posed by the lawsuit itself-a threat, as noted,
that the military has never substantiated. Unlike a tort action which might
directly challenge the validity of orders given, a typical personnel action to
upgrade a discharge from dishonorable to honorable, or even to challenge
denial of a promotion would ordinarily pose little threat to discipline.
C. Separation of Powers
Courts often refuse to review actions against the military on the
grounds that the Constitution requires judicial deference to Congress and
the President with respect to military matters." 2 Case law in this area is
decidedly confused. As the Eighth and Ninth circuit cases, Hill, and
Mindes demonstrate, even when courts grant review of military actions
governed by a statute, they defer substantially to the judgment of the
military.
1. Deference to Political Branches
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress broad jurisdic-
tion over the formation of rules governing the military." 3 Article II, sec-
tion 2 makes the President the Commander in Chief of the armed forces.
108. Brown, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (regulations requiring servicepersons to obtain command ap-
proval before circulating petitions do not violate First Amendment).
109. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (Articles 133 and 134 of UCMJ, authorizing court-
martial for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" and for conduct to prejudice of good
order and discipline, neither unconstitutionally vague nor facially invalid due to overbreadth).
110. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986) (Air Force may prohibit wearing of yar-
mulke because regulations were within scope of military power to regulate itself).
111. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (no Fifth Amendment due process or Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in summary court-martial).
112. See Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the Military, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 387, 397-403 (1984).
113. That section gives Congress the power to "declare War, . raise and support Armies, .
provide and maintain a Navy[,] . . . make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces[,] . . . provide for calling forth the Militia, . . . [and] provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia." U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8, cl. 14.
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Some commentators have characterized these powers as "exclusive." 114
These commentators do not explain, however, why Congress' power over
the military should be reviewed with any more deference than any other
power granted under Article I, section 8.115 For example, although courts
recognize congressional powers under the commerce clause, they still reg-
ularly review the constitutionality of statutes passed thereunder. More-
over, they regularly interpret the meaning of those statutes.11 Congress'
power to make rules governing the armed forces no more precludes judi-
cial review of statutes governing the military than the commerce clause
precludes judicial review of statutes governing interstate trucking. And the
President's power under the Commander in Chief clause is not relevant to
whether Title VII applies to uniformed personnel.1 1 7 Courts may not ab-
dicate their duties of constitutional and statutory interpretation merely be-
cause the military is involved."'
2. Deference to the Military
The Mindes test and its application in the Hill case illustrate the prob-
lematic nature of judicial deference to the military. The Mindes test con-
sists of four criteria for determining whether federal courts should review
a military action: (1) the nature and strength of plaintiff's claim; (2) the
potential injury to plaintiff if review is denied; (3) the type and degree of
anticipated interference with military functions; and (4) the extent to
114. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 4, at 288 (assumes, without support, that "the Constitution
grants Congress plenary authority over the military").
115. See Note, supra note 112, at 411.
116. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding power of
Congress to charter Bank of United States). Under accepted doctrines of judicial review, a court may
refuse to hear a case only if the court lacks jurisdiction or if the case is nonjusticiable. Courts invoking
the justiciability requirement with respect to the military often imply that the political question doc-
trine bars complete review. The Supreme Court articulated the political question doctrine in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The most important inquiry that that case suggests is whether there exists
"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment." Id. at 217. In Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell J., concurring), Justice
Powell synthesized two additional strands of inquiry from the remaining five in Baker: questions
whose resolution would require the Court to move beyond areas of judicial expertise and questions
where prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention. See infra text and accompanying
notes 129-34.
Given the narrow view of textual commitments taken by the Supreme Court even where the consti-
tutional language is more suggestive of delegation than Article I, section 8, see Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959), the Court would be unlikely to find a delegation where the language is structurally
identical to that of the commerce clause. See Note, supra note 112, at 397-403.
117. That clause would only be relevant if it were claimed that the statute, if it applied, would
infringe upon the President's powers as Commander in Chief. Given Congress' express power to
make rules governing the armed forces, a plaintiff probably could not prevail with this argument. It
was not made in any of the cases.
118. Cf Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S.
1042 (1980) (court will not defer to agency's pronouncement on constitutional question).
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which military expertise or discretion exists.119 However, although the
court intended the test to answer the question of whether to review or
abstain, the first two criteria go to the merits of a case. The test directs
courts to evaluate the merits of a case in deciding whether to review it. 20
Therefore, the test encourages courts to determine the merits before they
are likely to have sufficient information with which to do so properly.
Because of its incoherent nature, courts have often applied the Mindes
analysis not as an abstention doctrine, but as a standard of deference on
the merits.12' The Hill v. Berkman court, for instance, applied the test in
this manner. After finding that Title VII applied to uniformed personnel,
the court introduced the Mindes analysis to justify a severe limitation on
that application. First, in dictum, it stated that Title VII should not apply
to "isolated individual allegations of discrimination." '22 This dictum, be-
cause it suggested that courts actually abstain from review of individual
instances of discrimination, was close to the spirit of Mindes. It was, how-
ever, far from the spirit of Title VII, which does not permit either indi-
vidual instances of discrimination or discrimination pursuant to institu-
tional policy.' Second, the court altered the standard of liability under
Title VII for military policy decisions. For those decisions, the court ruled
that the test is "whether the military decision was clearly arbitrary and
erroneous, with a harmful effect present at the time the dispute reaches
the court."'" The critical factual question "is whether the [military]
clearly acted in bad faith.' 25 But Title VII allows no good faith defense
119. Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971); see supra text and accompanying notes
69-75.
120. Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d 316, 323 (3d Cir. 1981). Dillard laid out an alternate test,
which inquires broadly whether review would result in the court's encroachment upon the legislative
and executive branches' constitutional responsibilities. Id. at 320-22. See Comment, supra note 71, at
619. Commentators have criticized the Dillard test on the ground that it fails to clarify sufficiently
when review of military decisions is appropriate and that it is overinclusive. Id. at 620.
The Mindes test resembles tests used by courts for determining whether to grant preliminary in-
junctions. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. PROC. 65. Such criteria may be appropriate where preliminary
relief is concerned because the parties are entitled to subsequent review on the merits and because
courts must protect defendants from irreparable harm arising out of unwarranted issuance of injunc-
tions. Courts should not employ speculative criteria, however, where a plaintiff may be denied review
altogether.
121. Courts have applied the political question doctrine, another abstention doctrine, in a simi-
larly confused fashion. See Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597
(1976); Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA
L. REv. 1135 (1970).
122. Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1241.
123. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (individual instances/dispa-
rate treatment); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (institutional policy/disparate
impact).
124. Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1241.
125. Id.
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to claims of disparate impact. 128 The abstention test of Mindes nowhere
authorizes alteration of statutory burdens.
Even observers who find Judge Weinstein's decision wise under the cir-
cumstances must concede that, given its premise, it was wrong. Having
found that Title VII applied to uniformed personnel, Judge Weinstein
then effectively amended the statute with respect to its application to
them. The function of courts, however, is to interpret and apply statutes,
not amend them. Amendment of statutes is a lawmaking function commit-
ted by the Constitution to Congress. A court may not decline to apply a
statute otherwise applicable because it seems unwise to do so in a certain
situation, nor may it decree limitations on a statute not found in its text or
in the Constitution. 27
3. Institutional Competence
Ostensibly because they lack expertise with respect to military disci-
pline, courts often defer to military judgment. The judiciary, however, has
not demonstrated any less competence in considering individual rights in
the military than in prison, government employment, or national security
contexts-other settings involving considerations of discipline or other
complex and sensitive matters. 28 The military has failed to justify suffi-
ciently why the issue of discipline should be privileged above all others.
The Supreme Court has, under the umbrella of the political question doc-
trine, denied plaintiffs a remedy that would have required continuous ju-
dicial surveillance of the training, weaponry, and orders of the military. "
A Title VII remedy, however, would not infringe upon these areas of
military expertise. Moreover, in most Title VII cases, statutory interpre-
126. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. Although plaintiff Hill alleged disparate treatment, which re-
quires a showing of intent, the court's holding appeared to require a showing of bad faith even for
claims of disparate impact.
127. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 1; cf United States v. Guy Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953)
(executive agreement may not bypass statute).
128. See military discrimination cases cited supra note 100; Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 365
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 852-56 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (reviewing and upholding exclusion of
women from certain guard positions in male penitentiaries on BFOQ rationale under Title VII); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (public debate on foreign policy); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (schools); United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967) (defense employment).
Note that the incompetence argument is a "slippery slope." If the Supreme Court allowed gave
credence to it, every case dealing with a complex institution might require a special tribunal.
129. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court observed that "this is not a case in which
damages are sought . . . .Nor is it an action seeking a restraining order against some specified and
imminently threatened unlawful action. Id. at 5. Title VII actions typically involve damages and Title
VII grants courts considerable equitable discretion. A Title VII remedy for discrimination would not
involve a court in decisions about strategy and weaponry beyond its expertise.
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tation and individual rights-the core of judicial expertise-will be the
central issues, not discipline.
To leave such determinations to the military, on the other hand, would
pose two problems. First, the military possesses neither the competence
nor the jurisdiction to assess statutory or constitutional claims of discrimi-
nation. 3 The Constitution assigns this function to the judiciary, not the
executive branch. Second, military superiors trying to assess such claims
would face a conflict of interest between their perceived need for discipline
and the complainants' rights.1"' In fact, "the need for formal protections
of independence is probably at its greatest in the military context, where
discipline and institutional loyalty are most intense.'
3 2
IV. APPLYING TITLE VII TO THE MILITARY
Application of Title VII has not wrought havoc upon police or fire
departments, hospitals, or other institutions that demand discipline from
their employees. Application of Title VII to actions by uniformed person-
nel would not cause chaos within the military either. In drafting the pro-
visions of Title VII, Congress provided procedural hurdles for plaintiffs
and remedial discretion for courts to avoid disrupting institutions or flood-
ing the courts. These provisions are just as capable of operating with re-
spect to the military as with respect to other institutions.
A. Procedure: Exhaustion of Remedies
Title VII requires federal employees aggrieved by agency discrimina-
tion to comply with rigorous administrative procedures. 3 In brief, before
a complainant may file a suit in court, or even appeal to the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), complainant must: attempt
conciliation through an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Coun-
selor; file a formal written complaint with the agency; review the disposi-
tion proposed after an investigation by the agency EEO Director; request
a formal hearing by a complaints examiner or a review by the agency
head; and receive a final agency decision. At each stage, plaintiff must
130. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Jiudges, not military
officers, possess the competence and authority to interpret and apply the First Amendment."); Schles-
inger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 763-65 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (courts and military
tribunals possess expertise over constitutional and other questions not requiring particular military
knowledge); Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 83, at 435.
131. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. at 368-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Because they invariably
have the visage of overriding importance, there is always a temptation to invoke security 'necessities'
to justify an encroachment upon civil liberties."); Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 83, at 435
("[C]ourts should be skeptical of claims of military necessity.").
132. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision,
1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 223.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-16(c) (1982).
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comply with strict deadlines or waiting periods."" Only after final agency
action (or after 180 days if no final action has been taken) may the claim-
ant appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
or to federal district court.13 5
Unfortunately, unlike the programs of other agencies, the Department
of Defense Equal Opportunity Program is limited substantially to educa-
tion, evaluation of statistical data, and enforcement of nondiscrimination
requirements concerning use of facilities.1" Military Equal Opportunity
(EO) officers may not investigate complaints of discrimination.137 They
have no independent authority. As an Army regulation expressly states,
"In reality, the Commander is the Equal Opportunity Officer and, as
such, is assisted by staff members having Equal Opportunity responsibili-
ties.""' Individuals must use command channels for the redress of griev-
ances. Those channels are woefully inadequate.1 3 9
To protect itself and its personnel, the military should appoint a Direc-
tor of Equal Opportunity and Equal Employment Opportunity Counsel-
ors as provided for in Title VII and the regulations promulgated pursuant
thereto. 40 The rigorous exhaustion requirements will protect the military
from frivolous suits while the independence of the EEO officers would
afford complainants more vigorous and unbiased investigation than they
receive at present. The exhaustion provision seeks to preserve the balance
of power between the judiciary and the military or other government
agency "by regulating the timeliness of court review rather than the ulti-
mate availability of review,"'' as the separate community doctrine and
the Mindes test so inadequately attempt.4 2
B. Substance: The Prima Facie Case and the Defense of Necessity
If afforded a cause of action against the military, a serviceperson who
had fulfilled the exhaustion requirement would have to establish a prima
facie case of disparate treatment or disparate impact, just as any Title VII
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1613 (1986).
135. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.231, .281 (1986).
136. See 29 C.F.R. § 191 (1985); AR 600-21 (1977).
137. AR 600-21 at para. 2-5. In fact, the strongest argument that Title VII does not apply to the
military is that the military is not subject to the jurisdiction of the EEOC. See Gonzalez v. Army, 718
F.2d 926, 928 (1983). But the legislative history demonstrates that Congress simply retained much of
an existing procedure when it vested jurisdiction in the Civil Service Commission. H.R. Rep. No.
238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2137.
138. Id. at para. 4-1.
139. See Supra text and accompanying notes 32-42.
140. See supra text and accompanying notes 133-35.
141. Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies Re-
quirement, 55 VA. L. REv. 483, 500 (1969).
142. See Comment, supra note 41, at 380-82; supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff would. 143 Then the military, like any other Title VII defendant,
would have an opportunity to rebut with a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation (BFOQ) or business necessity defense. 44 A BFOQ defense arose in
the Hill case. In accepting it, the court employed an argument so deferen-
tial to the military as to be circular. The court held that "[b]ecause com-
bat risk is an occupational qualification mandated by statute, it is an ap-
propriate BFOQ exception to Title VII. ' ' 146 The court reasoned further
that "[b]y extension, the Army policy on women in combat, though not
codified by Congress, should be accorded the weight of a statute." Assum-
ing arguendo that the statutory combat exclusion renders sex a BFOQ for
military combat positions, "Army policy" should not thereby escape judi-
cial scrutiny. Agency policies, even military ones, are not entitled to the
same deference as federal statutes.1 46 If the military uses the combat ex-
clusion or any other statute as a pretext for discrimination,147 or draws its
regulations overbroadly,148 it should be liable under Title VII. If Title
143. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), sets forth a four-point test for
evaluating plaintiff's prima facie case for disparate treatment, but cautions that its guidelines are not
rigid. Id. at 802 & n.13. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), sets out the prima
fade case for disparate impact.
144. Two other statutory defenses related to testing and seniority have received considerable judi-
cial attention. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). In addition, Title VII contains numerous minor
defenses among its provisions.
The statutory BFOQ defense is narrower than the judicially created business necessity defense. The
legislative history of Title VII, the EEOC, and the courts all assert that the BFOQ is to be applied
only in rare situations. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). In
particular, the BFOQ defense applies only to hiring and referrals, not to discrimination between
current employees. Moreover, a BFOQ is not a defense to a charge of racial discrimination in any
situation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982). A court will find a BFOQ only if the "essence of the
business operation would be undermined otherwise." Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442
F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971). Public 'preferences and prejudices do not constitute BFOQ's unless
they are based on an entity's inability to perform its primary function. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389. But see
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding exclusion of women from certain guard posi-
tions in male penitentiaries on BFOQ rationale). See generally Comment, Bona Fide Occupation
Qualifications and the Military Employer: Opportunities for Females and the Handicapped, 11
AKRON L. REv. 182 (1977).
The judicially created business necessity defense is less rigorous than the BFOQ. Courts do not
define it consistently. See generally Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Effects Standard of
Liability in Title VII litigation, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 555, 590-606 (1985).
145. Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. at 1240.
146. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that agency actions shall be overturned where
they are "contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)
(1982). The Act includes the military in the definition of agency, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1982), except
courts-martial and military commissions, 5 U.S.C. § 555(1)(F) (1982), and "military authority exer-
cised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory," 5 U.S.C. § 551(G) (1982). See, e.g.,
Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (1976) (constitutional validity of Marine Corps regulation
enacted pursuant to broad Congressional authorization, see 10 U.S.C. § 5031(d) (1982), subject to
judicial review).
147. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (plaintiff entitled to
prove defendant's stated reason for discrimination is pretext in disparate treatment cases); Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (apparently necessary rule having disparate impact
and imposed with discriminatory purpose violates Title VII.
148. Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (necessary discrimina-
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VII applies to the military as the Hill court held, the military may avail
itself of any statutory defense or of the less rigorous business necessity
defense. In so doing, however, the military must meet the statutory burden
of proof with respect to its statutory defenses unless Congress amends Ti-
tle VII. Likewise, the military should have to prove, not simply articulate,
a business necessity defense.
C. Remedies
Under Title VII, a court may award a plaintiff a panoply of legal and
equitable remedies, including but not limited to reinstatement, hiring,
back pay, and any other equitable remedy to fashion the most complete
relief possible."49 In practice, trial courts have little discretion to deny full
back pay up to two years and complete remedial seniority. 150 No punitive
damages are allowed, however, and courts have already granted reinstate-
ment and remedial seniority, among other equitable remedies, to ser-
vicepersons for a variety of causes of action.15' Although courts have dis-
cretion only to fashion the most complete relief possible, most forms of
equitable relief, such as reporting obligations and conditional decrees, are
by nature more flexible than back pay and seniority. Article III courts, by
tradition extremely, if not unduly deferential to military needs, are not
likely to fashion highly intrusive Title VII remedies. The separate com-
munity doctrine, the Mindes test, and most courts' unwillingness to apply
Title VII to the military at all suggest that courts will tread softly in the
equitable area. For example, the Hill court, the only court to apply Title
VII to servicepersons, refused to afford the plaintiff any relief whatsoever
despite "flaws" in the military's procedure.' 52 Rather than create a wave
of judicial intrusion into military affairs, provision of a Title VII remedy
would encourage the military itself to eradicate discrimination within its
ranks so as to avoid any intrusion.
V. CONCLUSION
The legislative history of Title VII clearly mandates that the statute be
construed broadly to include all situations not expressly excluded. The
tion must be as narrowly circumscribed as possible).
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g), -16(d) (1982).
150. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-25 (1974) (backpay); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (seniority).
151. See Dillard v. Brown 652 F.2d 316 (3rd Cir. 1981) (authorizing review of claim to enjoin
military from discharging plaintiff); Dilley v. Alexander, 603 F.2d 914 (1974) (ordering reinstatement
of officer discharged by improperly constituted review board); Colson v. Bradley, 477 F.2d 739. (2d
Cir. 1973) (ordering military review of plaintiff's claim that he was unfairly passed over for promo-
tion and discharged).
152. Hill v. Berkman, 638 F. Supp. 1228, 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
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military argues, on the contrary, that uniformed personnel should be ex-
cluded because they were not expressly included. Given the legislative his-
tory, judicial interpretation and compelling purposes behind the statute,
the military's arguments are unconvincing. The courts should apply Title
VII as written to uniformed military personnel. Adherence to the proce-
dural provisions of Title VII and judicious use of remedial discretion will
protect the interests of the military. If the result is undesirable, then Con-
gress, not the courts, may amend the statute.
Justice Douglas once explained that
it is the function of the courts to make sure . . . that the men and
women constituting our Armed Forces are treated as honored mem-
bers of society whose rights do not turn on the charity of a military
commander. . . .A member of the Armed Forces is entitled to equal
justice under law not as conceived by the generosity of a commander
but as written in the Constitution and engrossed by Congress in our
Public Laws.153
In protecting the rights of military personnel under Title VII, the courts
would no doubt also protect the security of the nation. As General Doug-
las MacArthur once pointed out, morale within the military "will quickly
wither and die if soldiers come to believe themselves the victims of indif-
ference or injustice on the part of their government, or of ignorance, per-
sonal ambition, or ineptitude on the part of their military leaders."154
153. Winters v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 57, 59-60 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1968).
154. Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1933,
quoted in BARTLETr's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 771 (15th ed. 1982).
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